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A Covid Agenda from the 
Perspective of Adolescent 
Girls and Young Women
judith Bruce
iF i had Been asKed to write this commentary a year ago (December 2019), 
I would have offered the same top-line messages about the demographic 
agenda, focusing on a core constituency for that agenda—adolescent girls 
and young women in the poorest countries and communities. Applying De-
cember 2020 hindsight—no pun intended—these areas of inquiry hold, even 
though they are selectively amplified and reshaped by Covid. To understand 
what is unfolding before our eyes requires an unsparing inquiry from a post-
Covid perspective. We must track not only traditional impacts, but ask what 
strategies and programs/projects mitigated negative impacts and promoted 
positive ones. The needed research can be very roughly sorted into individual, 
household, and community levels, with considerable overlaps and linkages 
among the three. Priority for the research investment should be accorded to 
the populations most excluded and at risk pre-Covid.
The first impact of the pandemic worthy of study is its effect on the fe-
male dependency burden—not the conventional age-structure dependency 
burden, but the already disproportionate share of food and water provision-
ing, schooling, and physical-care responsibilities falling on females. Is the 
pandemic intensifying and redefining the burden? And on which females? A 
high and rising proportion of females can expect to be sole or majority provid-
ers for themselves, their children and grandchildren, and their parents and 
grandparents. Even when males are present and contributing, female income 
to a far greater extent than male income is “family income.” If current pat-
terns hold post-Covid, resources and income under female control will have 
many times the family impact of comparable income under male control 
and, therefore, increasing females’ economic inclusion should be prioritized.
Girls’ exercise of sexual and reproductive rights requires more than 
information and service access. They, like male peers, must have viable 
economic choices and an identity independent of sexuality, marriage, and 
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childbearing. Key to this is preparation for decent livelihoods, which can be 
measured by proxies such as completed schooling, mastery of basic finan-
cial and digital skills, incubator savings, and the social networks on which 
livelihoods often depend. Girls’ acquisition of such assets promotes deferred 
marriage and planned fertility; reduces the risk of STIs, including HIV/AIDS; 
and increases intergenerational investment in children’s health and educa-
tion. How will the dislocations of the pandemic—not only school disruption, 
but also girls’ visible economic response in this emergency—affect girls’ self-
identification as economic actors in their life-course and reproductive aspira-
tions? And, just as vitally, will there be a public appreciation of their burden 
and promise, which translates into increased investment in their economic 
inclusion? In the poorest communities pre-Covid, girls’ completion of sec-
ondary school was already at risk. During Covid, an all-girls school drawing 
students from a deprived rural Tanzanian district reported that the majority 
of the 300 girls returning to school post-confinement had not had the time 
nor facilities required to complete their “remote” studies. Most had been 
absorbed in survival caring and provisioning at home and some were sent 
to work the land (less true of their brothers). A network of school graduate 
mentors overseeing “girls’ clubs” in home communities feared that mentees 
in the public system, in which post-confinement had extended school by two 
hours, would be under pressure to drop out given their role backstopping the 
family survival strategy.
The pandemic may further alter the “shape” of girls’ lives, which is 
markedly different than that of boys. Girls’ biological puberty is earlier 
(approximately age 12) than that of boys; girls’ age of socially constructed 
“puberty” is often even younger in some traditional settings and many “mod-
ern” ones—owing to sexualizing norms promoted by social media. Girls’ 
reproductive health, social, and economic trajectories are largely set by age 
15. For males, not only is biological puberty later, but its consequences more 
favorable—their lives are getting better, their mobility greater, their share 
of everything (including power) increased. Girls’ resilience is tested in early 
adolescence, and few poor girls have an orderly transition to adulthood as 
per the policy nostrum life course—have adequate food, have vaccinations, 
enter school, complete school, find employment, select life partner, start a 
family, remain securely married. The observance of this script is a privilege 
for both males and females, but far rarer for deprived females. A longitudinal 
dataset from Malawi revealed that females were ten times more likely than 
male peers to undergo a major “transition”—leaving school, sexual initiation, 
marriage, becoming a parent, moving household, etc., between the ages of 
16 and 19. We need to study the impacts of the pandemic on events—leav-
ing school, labor and sexual exploitation, household displacement, etc., that 
have the potential to move girls off-track permanently. And, from a response 
point of view, what types of programs—and timing beginning at what age—
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can prevent the worst outcomes and offer second chances to those who have 
already fallen behind?
Females’ sexual, marriage, and labor markets are already harmfully 
intertwined and possibly further complicated by Covid conditions. Females’ 
sexual exposure rises in crisis, when sex may be included in the price of sur-
vival goods. Displacement/confinement-driven “marriages” increase the risk 
of unsafe pregnancy, and for many young mothers solo lifetime responsibility 
for children. Such marriages, even when they provide a temporary sense of 
protection, may simply defer risk to the young bride. They can be both un-
stable and unsafe, owing to a lack of meaningful consent, the haste of their 
conclusion, and mobility pressures on one or both partners to secure work 
and food. Campaigns to end child marriage in South Asia and sub-Saharan 
Africa report setbacks under Covid as destitute parents see marrying off a 
young daughter as an emergency poverty-alleviation response. Research 
questions include how the countervailing pressures on families to preserve 
adolescent females’ marriageability and family reputation, while also having 
an urgent need for survival income, are (were) resolved under Covid. What 
are (were) the results for girls’ marriage timing, partner selection, pressure 
for children, and marital stability?
The lives of the girls and young women central to this commentary are 
strongly conditioned by household demands. Household size and composi-
tion and how the “family” is socially constructed and its rules for allocating 
labor and food resources are vital information for demographic assessments 
and the design of relief and recovery efforts. Local meanings of household 
“headship” must be closely interrogated, lest this role be mechanically as-
signed to the oldest male, even if he is seldom home and it is the females who 
are bringing in most resources. When households are entitled to support, 
whether in kind or cash or access to services, how is it optimally delivered 
into complex households? Distribution of food during the rehabilitation phase 
of the Biafran crisis was encumbered by insufficient understanding of who 
was responsible for feeding whom. Malnourished children were not always 
the responsibility of their biological mothers, but of the female partners of 
their fathers. Households readily adapt when stressed by external shocks. In 
many deprived settings, new shocks—such as Covid—compound and extend 
old ones. In the Sahel, afflicted by long-term environmental degradation, 
drought, and endemic conflict, large nominally male-headed compounds 
are often composed of multiple female-centered families with each female in 
charge of provisioning her “cooking pot” dependents. 
Household power relations can be disrupted by Covid confinement. Men 
spending more time at home, accompanied by reports of escalating domestic 
violence, has turned attention to the relations between adult partners—but 
there are other power relations to investigate. A field report from Kenya re-
layed a provisional finding of more shared decision-making over resources 
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under Covid. Perhaps, but plausibly, female partners permit power-sharing 
to make peace and compensate for lost control by allocating more work to 
younger females. An interesting question will be how, under Covid confine-
ment conditions, adolescent girls’ labor, fertility, sexuality, and claim on food 
figure into household bargaining between adult partners. To what extent do 
females shift the burden of provisioning and caregiving among themselves 
rather than challenge the privilege and leisure of older and younger males?
On a brighter note, it will be worth examining how Covid can (from 
the strategy and program/project design point of view) or did (from the les-
sons learned point of view) open up new livelihood opportunities for young 
females. Covid has increased likely durable demand for locally available, af-
fordable, nutritious food and potable water; primary health care; safer, more 
comfortable multipurpose homes; low-cost renewable energy, and reliable 
digital connectivity for work, technical, and in-person learning aids. But, if 
these new opportunities materialize, can or will they be seized safely? Increas-
ing home-based work in poor settings accommodates childcare and home 
schooling, but generates little income, can reduce female control over earn-
ings, and may raise tensions with partners. Traditional work in community 
fields or marketplaces, though not risk-free, is conducted in familiar locations 
with some protective mechanisms. Post-Covid, better-paid work in modern-
izing sectors may entail mobility, new personalities, and places to navigate 
and skills to master—but also incur high safety and sexual risks.  
Finally, it is important to study Covid at the community level as crises 
illuminate and intensify preexisting divisions. Information about community 
substructures is vital to craft responses that strengthen social cohesion, chan-
nels of communication, and competence in delivering core services. Pre-Covid 
conventional community-engagement strategies, including “youth mobiliza-
tion,” convened forums, curated “dialogues,” and delivered resources in ways 
that tended to reinforce male dominance and formal control over community 
facilities and grant males preferential access to new technologies. Female 
leadership (where it existed) was token, and few avenues were provided for 
the expression of the needs of younger females or poorer households with 
children.
The learning opportunity—analytic and programmatic—of defining 
meaningful access to valued resources for different demographic segments 
cannot be overstated. Neither communities nor girls in the same communi-
ties are homogeneous. Rapid Covid responses have assumed sufficient—if 
not uniform—connectivity to render remote health and schooling support 
effective. Yet, in urban Ethiopia, girls in domestic service had negligible (and 
not private) phone access. In contrast, in Mozambique, an adolescent girls 
initiative with just weeks of experience in a new site had created enough 
social capital that neighbors lent phones to girls to receive Covid protection 
instructions and coordinate drop-off of food and hygienic supplies and home-
learning lesson plans. In places where girls have more cell phone coverage 
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they may have enhanced access to protection protocols and remote social 
support but are also subject to sexual messaging and trafficking. 
The delineation of communities into segments may require refinement 
to see pre- and post-Covid “transitions” more clearly. Standard cohort seg-
mentation may not serve; for example, girls 10 to 14 may be more usefully 
divided into girls 10 to 12 and 13 to 14 given the demographic significance 
of puberty and transition to secondary school. In some settings, classifying 
females not simply by their age but also by the age of the children for which 
they are responsible might be instructive. Once segmentation has been con-
textualized, we can explore for each segment what is “their” safe access to 
core resources (e.g., food security, water, health care), “their” time use, and 
“their” community of information (how and from whom “they” share infor-
mation, what information is trusted and actionable). There may be segment-
specific mental health impacts of Covid conditions. Psychological traumas 
may rob the young of their resilience, even when external factors improve. 
Younger females may be especially subject to depression, withdrawal, and a 
loss of the confidence needed to resist religious authoritarianism and demean-
ing gender roles.
That said, and equally worthy of study, there are shining examples in 
the context of Covid and other emergencies of young female cadres function-
ing as frontline “social first responders.” Female mentors and their adoles-
cent mentees have provided rapid responses to food insecurity, shaped and 
updated Covid protection messages, met reproductive health needs with 
privacy, interceded in medical emergencies and domestic violence, assisted 
community-wide at-home learning through virtual platforms, and delivered 
in person, when possible, critical goods, even homemade sanitary supplies 
and emergency entitlements to the most in-need households. The question 
is, can the knowledge the Covid pandemic revealed about intracommunity 
inequalities in access and the disruption it brought to traditional community 
structures be constructively harnessed? Can this experience bolster the com-
mitment to inclusive communities with accountable plans to reach the most 
vulnerable, actively solicit young female participation, establish permanent 
female-accessible platforms through which to deliver health information, 
mental health, social support, as well as vital commodities including contra-
ception, and increase food security, impart livelihood skills, extend connec-
tivity, and build a wider basis of civic engagement—before the next crisis?
Acknowledgments
The author acknowledges the support of colleagues Sophie Soares, Samantha Berg, Kelly Hall-
man, Annabel Erulkar, Angel del Valle and the Adolescent Girls Community of Practice partners 
Girl MOVE Academy, Nurturing Minds/SEGA Girls School, Batonga Foundation, Indigenous 
Adolescent Girls Empowerment Network (IMAGEN), the Population Council’s Abriendo 
Oportunidades and Biruh Tesfa for All projects, and Rima Mourtada and James Phillips for so 
generously sharing their broad knowledge.   
